An unexpected contact on the professional network. An offer of employment from a recruiter, most likely a young woman, based in China. The opportunity to make around £20,000 on the side writing a handful of political reports for a Chinese company containing confidential or “insider” information. Payment in cryptocurrency or cash preferred.
It may seem clear, on this telling, that something about this approach would be suspicious. However, Beijing's powerful intelligence agency continues to view it valuable to use recruitment consultants to attempt this – leading the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their activity on the internet.
Large-Scale Approaches on Professional Networks
In 2023, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said operatives from China were contacting Britons on the platform on an unprecedented scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the preceding two and a half years, attempting to obtain governmental, industrial, defense and scientific classified information. But a fresh campaign targeting politicians and parliament has prompted the spy agency to take further action.
A spying alert was issued on Tuesday via the administrative teams of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords counterpart: a single slide after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.
Security Approach and Legislative Changes
In the curious style of British intelligence, there was no publication of the protective guidance from MI5 or the Home Office. Yet the agency was aware its advisory document would become public once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the media helps the wider public better identify interactions with a fraudulent purpose.
This warning has the impact of uncovering additional details from within parliament, though that is not the agency's main objective. The agency wants people in public life to recognize that just because interactions on LinkedIn are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Nor is internal security service understood to have been reacting to any specific incident in the legislature, though the recent actions occur after the embarrassing collapse of the prosecution of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his friend another person on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been charged of working for China – a charge they denied – but inability to successfully conclude a trial under the since replaced previous legislation resulted in concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Legislation and China's Strategic Interests
The law has since been updated, and the security briefing contains a note of its replacement: “Individuals involved in espionage activity risk substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” This constitutes a criminal offense if somebody engages in conduct that is or is likely to “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious question, though, is what Beijing has to gain. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have limited access of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs less so. But Beijing is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the Britain's approach to China on matters such as Huawei or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Cultural Differences and Ongoing Cyber Risks
In part there are cultural differences too. Authoritarian governments like Beijing's export intelligence collection techniques and the scale of its spy network is enormous, engaging 300,000 individuals. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, commented it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity involved in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
Beijing is willing to develop contacts over the long term and sometimes even the intelligence services have struggled to differentiate legitimate relationships and spying. “China has a minimal requirement for which details is deemed to be useful,” the minister responsible a government official told MPs on Wednesday, but a rapid shift in the political cycle may mean someone rapidly peripheral becomes significant.
Another way to think about the continuous efforts at covert information gathering is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between China and the west at a level under the level of outright war. The nation has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless internet devices.
Beijing is involved in persistent efforts to find secret informants on British democracy online because it wants to be challenging, to display influence and because it can.
